Television Programming—Its Legal Limitations by Fleming, J. Carlton
TELEVISION PROGRAMMING-ITS LEGAL
LIMITATIONS
The advisable degree of limitation on program content
has long been a controversial point among leaders in radio
and television. Justin Miller, president of the National
Association of Broadcasters, has steadily attacked existing
controls as gross limitations on the right of free speech.1
Others have lamented that the present restraints are "net-
works of inadequacy." 2 FCC Chairman Wayne Coy has
publicly decried the lack of control. 3
In recent months' the din has diminished. The lull, at
least as to television, may readily be ascribed to the cur-
rently-enforced FCC "freeze", which rejects all applications
for television channels pending hearings and decisions by
the Commission determining from a technical viewpoint the
proper method of channel allocation. Since competition
for channels is precluded, the Commission has few oppor-
tunities to express itself on program restraints. One might
well imagine, however, that as the "freeze" begins to thaw,
as it undoubtedly must in the near future, temperatures in
television circles and in the Commission will rise commen-
surately, and that advocates on either side will again attack,
hammer and tong, the problem of program limitations.
It is not the purpose of this writing to support either side
of the controversy, but rather to summarize briefly the
limitations that do exist, outside the conscience of the
advertiser, the better judgment of the station, and the dial-
twisting ability of the public.
It may be 1profitably observed at the outset that legal
boundaries are seldom high stone walls. More often they
See 9 F.R.D. 217 (1949).
2 57 Yale L. J. 275 (1948); Edward Lamb, owner of WICU and
WTVN, "Anarchy in TV?", New York Times, Sunday, April 2, 1950:
Sec. 2, p. 9.
3 His most recent blast directed specifically at television was his
address before the Oklahoma Radio Conference, excerpts reported in
New York Times, March 15, 1950. The chairman, making obvious ref-
erences to Arthur Godfrey, lashed out at comedians peddling "livery
stable humor" and observed that "radio and television carry him
straight into the home without having taken the precaution to see that
he is housebroken."
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are indistinct lines in shifting sands. In television law is
this especially true. Few cases and fewer statutes refer
specifically to television. Rules must evolve from not alto-
gether perfect analogies to radio and newspaper law. In
many areas there is room for innovation; in others, logic
requires that old rules be re-applied. Standards do exist,
however, which give rise to a forecast of what limitations
the law will place on television programming. They may
be roughly grouped as: federal statutory restraints, the
law of defamation, the right of privacy, and FCC program
controls. The leading forces opposing such limitations are
the constitutional guarantee of free speech and statutory
and case law deterrents to censorship by the states and the
FCC.
Federal Statutory Restraints
Perhaps the clearest boundaries are those prescribed by
Federal statutes.
(1) Broadcasts concerning lotteries are governed by the
Criminal Code,' which provides that whoever broadcasts
"any advertisement of or information concerning any lot-
tery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes
dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any
list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such
lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether said list con-
tains any part or all of such prizes, shall be fined not more
than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Each day's broadcasting shall constitute a separate offense."
Exactly what constitutes a lottery under this section
remains doubtful. The Commission, following judicial in-
terpretations of the postal lottery laws, has found the
elements of a lottery to be "chance, prize and considera-
tion." 5 The difficulty in determining whether any given
scheme is a lottery or not stems from the various meanings
that may be assigned to "chance" and to "consideration".
In the law of contracts, consideration may arise when
there Is a benefit to the promisor, though there be no at-
'62 Stat. 768; 18 USCA, Sec. 1304, formerly See. 316, (7ommunica-
How Act of 1984.
I hs WR L Radio Station, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 687 (1936).
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tendant legal detriment to the promisee. Actually the
promisor-advertiser in a gift enterprise realizes an adver-
tising benefit, and a court could easily find consideration
where a merchant freely distributes to the public coupons
good for a can of beans. But the lottery laws are penal, and
therefore strictly construed. Thus a mere benefit to the
advertiser has been held insufficient under the statute.6 On
the other hand, the slightest action on the part of the
promisee-contestant, such as the mailing of a label, might
constitute a legal detriment and, hence, give rise to con-
sideration.7 Generally, however, the technical niceties of
consideration have not been indulged in. The Solicitor of
the Post Office Depaxtment in February, 1947, interpreting
a statute'with identical wording, suggested that considera-
tion, in the lottery sense of the word, is present only when
the questioned scheme involves "for example, the payment
of money for the -purchase of merchandise, chance or ad-
mission ticket, or as payment on account, or. requires an
expenditure of substantial effort or, time. On the other
hand, if itis required merely that one's name be registered
at a store in order to be eligible, for-the prize, consideration
is not deemed to be present-. .,8 .
A definition of chance is equally troublesome. Pure
chance is seldom encountered. Yet, experience teaches that
skill is seldom the-sole criterion in any-contest, no matter
how strictly the contest is supervised. Thus, whether
'hance" is present boils dbon to a comparison of how
much chance and how little skill is involved in a particular
scheme."
Although faced in the past' with relatively few lottery
questions; the FCC has teriied as violative of the lottery
provisions "bank night schemes";9 so-called "Prosperity
Clubs. operating on a vaffation of 'the chain-letitr -princi-
ple,10 and the giving of' raffle tickets with pilrchases.'
Where a format involved ,tbe reading of a question and
6 Affiliated Enterprises v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st. Cir. 1936).
7 Brooklyn Daily Eagle v. Voorhis, 181 Fed. 579 (E. D. N. Y. 1910).
"'Warner, Radio and Television Law, p. 344 '(1948).
1n re WRBL Radio- Station, Inc.; 2 F.C.C. 687 (1936).
' In re KX Broadcasters, 4 F.C.C. 186 (1937).
' In re Metropolitan Broadcasting Co., 5 F.C.C. 501 (1938).
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an answer, the picking at random of a telephone number,
followed by asking the same question to the person answer-
ing, the Commission decided that too little skill and too
much chance was involved. "The predominant distinction
between winners and non-winners is that the former had
been prepared by listening to the program whereas the
latter had not so prepared.' 12 A like finding was made as
to a program which consisted of drawing at random letters
of the alphabet, reading them on the air, and awarding a
prize to the first person skillful enough to spell his name
with the letters broadcast. There too the Commission
determined that the endurance of the listener in staying by
his radio outweighed his skill in spelling his name.18
In March of 1940, five programs savoring of lottery were
given an administrative green light following a conclusion
by the Department of Justice that none violated the lottery
provisions. 14 Two were of the "Pot o' Gold" variety, where
telephone numbers were drawn by chance and the person
called was awarded a prize simply for answering his phone.
Technical consideration might be found in the benefit to the
good will of the promissor, or in the detriment to the winner
in answering his phone. The determination was, however,
that the winner really had to do nothing and that there was
insufficient consideration for this purpose. 5 Two others,
involving the identification of songs played over the air,
required sufficient skill to rule out a finding of chance. In
the light of the 1948 decisions noted above,'2 failure to
prosecute because of the fifth program, "Sears Grab Bag",
is more difficult to understand. Numbered slips were drawn
from a box in front of a store and read on the air. If the
holder happened to be listening and called the station, a
prize was awarded to him. If he was not listening, the
prize went to the listener holding the number nearest to
the one drawn. Chance and prize were obviously present.
2 In re Northern Virginia Broadcasters, Inc., 4 R.R. 660 (1948).
2In re Coastal Broadcasting Co., 4 R.R. 751 (1948).
24 4 Ped. Com. Bar T. 195 (1940).
1This position was later affirmed in a tax case holding that the
prize on 'Tot o' Gold" was not income, but a gift, since the winner had
"done nothing." Washburn v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
10 Notes 12 and 13, supra.
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Moreover, the winner had to be a listener. On just such a
finding, the Commission ruled "consideration" in the 1948
cases. From the 1948 decisions and the administrative
scowl in the direction of "give-away" programs17 it is argu-
able that the Commission's concept of consideration is be-
coming more technical, and that a chance may still be a
chance though mingled with a degree of skill. On the other
hand, the cases may be distinguishable on the ground that
the program reviewed in 1940 required only a small amount
of listening time of the winner, while those condemned in
1948 required an "expenditure of substantial effort or
time."' 8
(2) The criminal code further provides: "Whoever utters
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000,
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 19  This
section has been invoked where a broadcaster himself used
1 See In re Commercial Radio Equipment Co., 11 F.C.C. 451, 465
(1946). In view of happenings elsewhere in the hemisphere, broad.
casters in the United States should be grateful that our government has
been content with a scowl. In May, 1950, the Minister of Communica-
tions in Argentina outlawed question-and-answer programs. 11 Fed.
Cor. Bar J. 181 (1950).
1" See note 8, supra. Several broadcasters, particularly those in
Nebraska and Wisconsin, have felt the pinch of state lottery laws. The
Attorney General of Nebraska, in an opinion handed down November
17, 1949, ruled that "Musical Tune-O", a game somewhat akin to bingo,
but played by matching numbers on a bingo card with songs played
over local stations, violated the Nebraska lottery laws. In June, 1950,
the Attorney General of Wisconsin ruled that a program which awarded
cash prizes to the holder of "the lucky social security number" was
illegal under Wisconsin lottery laws. In his opinion handed down
October 18, 1950, he ruled that a number of "give-aways", notably the
network program, "Stop the Music", were violative of Wisconsin lot-
tery provisions. Of the recognized lottery elements--chance, prize
and consideration-prize was obviously present. The Attorney General
found chance in the fact that so little skill was required. He found
consideration in the benefit to the promissor in enticement of a listen-
ing audience. See discussion in 11 Fed. Cor. Bar J. 167, et seq. (1950).
Although broadcasters havb never entertained much concern for state
lottery laws, these opinions may be indicative of a trend, particularly
since "give-aways" have borne the brunt of so much public criticism.
The Federal statute, 18 USCA. Sec. 1304, does not preclude the operation
of state lottery laws.
62 Stat. 769; 18 USCA, Sec. 1464, formerly Sec. 326, Comunica-
tions Act of 1934.
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such expressions as "by God" and "the curse of God", 0
and where a program entitled "Modern Women's Serenade"
advised listeners "in terms unequivocal, that through the
use of a particular medical or chemical compound, they
might avoid the consequences either of child-birth or moral
impropriety." 21 In 1938, the Commission cited several sta-
tions for broadcasting Eugene O'Neill's "Beyond the Hori-
zon" without deleting such expressions as "damn", "hell",
and "for God's sake". After a wave of public criticism, it
reconsidered the action and granted renewals to the cited
stations. 22 Radio's most publicized indecent feature, the
Mae West version of the story of Adam and Eve, brought a
letter of censure from the FCC, a public apology from NBC
and its affiliated stations. Subsequently all networks ban-
ned her from the air.2
(3) Advertising matter concerning new drugs is govern-
ed by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.24 Section
331 (1) prohibits the using "in any advertising relating
to such a drug, of any representation that an application
with respect to such drug is effective 'under section 355, or
that such drug complies with the provisions of such sec-
tion." Section 355 sets out as requirements for making
effective an application that tests prove that the drug is
safe under the conditions prescribed for its use and that
manufacturing and packaging controls are adequate to
preserve its identity, strength, quality and purity. A vio-
lator is subject to a fine of not more than $1000, imprison-
ment for not more than one year, or both, for the first
offense. Exceptions to the penalties, based on good faith
and prescribed in Sec. 333 (c), do not apply to the prohibi-
tion against false advertising. Nevertheless, a careful
telecaster can remain on safe ground with comparative ease.
The prohibition of the act relates only to "new drugs".
Liability is incurred only if the advertising matter repre-
sents either (1) that the new drug enjoys an application
2 Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1931).
In re Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., Inc., 2 F.C.C. 76, 77 (1933).
"- Warner, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 339.
• Ibid.
" 64 Stat. 20, 64 Stat. 1237; 21 USCA, Secs. 331, 333, 355.
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made effective by the Federal Security Administrator, or
(2). that the drug complies with the provisions of section
355. Exclusion of these two claims would seem to protect
the station from criminal liability. A safer course would
consist of a communication to the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs or to the Federal Security Administrator regard-
ing the status of any drug for which time is requested.
(4) 52 Stat. 114; 15 USCA, Sec. 52 prohibits the dissemi-
nation of false advertising likely to induce the purchase of
food, drugs, devices or cosmetics. Under 15 USCA, Sec.
54, a station is not criminally liable unless it refuses on
request to furnish the Federal Trade Commission the name
and address of the advertiser. Similarly, 53 Stat. 1282; 7
USCA Sec. 1575 makes it unlawful for any person to dis-
seminate false advertising concerning seed. Under the
terms of the section, a station is liable only if it refuses to
reveal the name and address of the advertiser to the Secre-
tary of Agriculture.
Defamation
The law of defamation, as applied to radio, has produced
patterns of irreconciliable case law and divergent statutes
in the several states. There is little hope that television
can do more than stir again the already muddied waters.
Courts have been beset with the common law idea that de-
famation is libel if written and slander if spoken; that
slander is not actionable without proof of special damage
unless it imputes a serious crime, certain loathsome dis-
eases, unfitness for one's calling, or, in some states, un-
chastity in a woman. 2 Faced with the difficulty of proving
special damage of a pecuniary nature, 6 plaintiffs soon came
to attack defamation over the air as libel. Such urgings
found willing judicial ears in Nebraska and Missouri,2 7
where the courts termed defamation by radio actionable
without proof of special damage. In New York an extem-
poraneous remark has been held to be slander,28 while a
= Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, Ch. 17, Sec. 92 (1941).
Ibid.
*T Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932); Coffey v.
Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F.Supp. 889 (Mo. 1934).
0 Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y.S. 188 (1937).
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defamatory statement read from a written script is libel.29
Although the majority of the New York court declined to
reach the point, Justice Fuld, concurring in the latter case,
suggested that the distinguishing factor between written
and extemporaneous remarks, when broadcast, was unim-
portant and that both should be held to be libel.
New Jersey and Pennsylvania have held that a station is
not liable for defamatory remarks of one not in its employ
if it could not have prevented broadcast by the exercise of
seasonable care.30 The New Jersey court felt that the posi-
tion of a radio station is analogous to that of a disseminator
or bookseller, who is generally held liable only when neg-
ligent.
Many states have enacted general libel and slander laws.
Florida, Iowa and Washington make stations liable only if
negligent.31 Montana provides that they shall not be liable
absent proof of actual malice.82 ' Indiana provides for no
liability'where the publication is made in good faith and a
retraction is made within a stated .period83 North Carolina
and California deny punitive damages where a retraction
is broadcast.3 4 Illinois and Virginia'render radio, and pre-
sumably television, immune from liability for defamation
by a political candidate.3 5 Statutes in other 'states, though
2 Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947).
3 Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Company, 336 Pa. 182,
8 A.2d 302 (1939); Kelly v. HoffmaL, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (1948).
8 Fla.StatAnn., sec. 770.03 (1944); Iowa Code, sec. 659.5 (1946);
Wash.Rev.Stat., see. 998-1 (Rem.Supp. 1943).
Mont.Rev.Code, sec. 5694.1.
Ind.Stat.Ann., sec. 2-518 (Burns 1946).
21 N.C.Gen.Stat., Sec. 99-1, 99-2 (1943); Cal.Civ.Code, sec 48a. The
California statute survived constitutional attack in April of 1950 when
Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspaper, 216 P.2d 825
(1950), reversed a contrary holding of the lower court. North Carolina
upheld its statute in Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 (1904),
while the statute referred only to defamation by newspapers. No case
has ruled on the constitutionality of the statute since its amendment to
refer to radio and television. Indeed, it is arguable that a retraction
by radio or television is not as effective as a newspaper retraction,
since largely the same group reads a given newspaper day after day,
while the audience of a radio or television station is subject to great
fluctuation. It is submitted, however, that the reasoning of the North
Carolina court would equally apply to the statute as amended.
Il.StatAnn., c. 38, sec. 404.1-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp., 1948); 1942
Va.Code, sec. 576b (Supp. 1948).
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not specifically mentioning radio and television, may be
broad enough to include both.
The average broadcaster's concern over the problem of
defamation was intensified by the Commission's celebrated
Port Huron decision, 6 in which it was declared that Sec.
315 of the Communications Act 7 precludes the censorship
and deletion of material from political broadcasts. The
Commission further concluded that state laws must be
suspended as to all speeches coming under Sec. 315, citing
the supremacy clause of the Constitution. Thus broadcast-
ers found themselves faced with unhappy alternatives. If
they allowed a defamatory statement in a politician's speech
to go uncensored, they ran the risk of an adverse ruling by
a state court unwilling to accept the rationale of the FCC.
If they censored the speech for defamatory material, the
Commission's edict had been violated.
To date, the Commission's position in the Port Huron
case has found little support in Congress or in the courts.8 s
It is arguable that Congress does have the power to override
state law in this respect, as a corollary to its power over
interstate commerce. Whether Congress has so acted in
passing Sec. 315 is however open to serious question. Wheth-
ed the Commission will enforce the Port Huron dictum is
another pertinent consideration. In the Port Huron case
itself, the broadcaster's application for renewal was granted
despite his censorship of political broadcasts for deletion
of defamatory matter. No later FCC decision has denied
an application on the basis of Port Huron. It has been sug-
gested that enforcement is not forthcoming.3 9
What at first appeared to be an impending showdown on
w Port Huron Broadcasting Co. (W-LS) 4 R.R. 1 (1948).
n 48 Stat. 1088; 47 USCA, Sec. 315: "If any licensee shall permit
any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office
to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting
station, and the Commission shall make rules and regulations to carry
this provision into effect: Provided, That such licensee shall have no
power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions
of this section. No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to
allow the use of its station by any such candidate."
n H. Rept. No. 2461, 80th Cong. 2d Sess., 1948, p. 2.
s See Warner, op cit. supra note 8, 1949 Supp., pp. 80-81.
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the matter arose from the 1949 campaign in Philadelphia.
A plaintiff brought suit for libel against several Philadel-
phia radio stations because of references to him in radio
speeches by the chairman of the Republican Central Com-
mittee. Applying the Pennsylvania rule that a station is
liable only if it is at fault.40 the court granted summary
judgment for the defendant, reasoning that Sec. 315 pre-
cluded censorship and that the station could not have been
at fault by adhering to the law.41 The problem of See. 315
versus state defamation laws appeared to have been squarely
met, at least as to those states following the Pennsylvania
rule of no absolute liability. On appeal,42 however, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pointed out that the
reasoning of the District Court had been for naught, that
the speaker had not been a candidate, and was therefore
not included in the provisions of Sec. 315. Since Sec. 315
did not preclude censorship of this speaker's script, it offered
no protection to the defendant stations. The judgment was
reversed and the holding of the District Court as to Sec. 315
and Pennsylvania libel laws died aborning.
Right of Privacy
Tracing its origin to a law review article,43 the right of
privacy has blossomed in sixty years into a generally rec-
ognized "right to be left alone." In three states, New York,
Utah and Virginia, the right is protected by statute.44 The
New York statute terms, in Sec. 50, the use "for advertising
purposes, or for the purposes of trade [of] the name, por-
trait or picture of any living person" without written con-
sent, a misdemeanor; and provides in Sec. 51 that the per-
son whose privacy has been invaded may sue for an injunc-
tion and for damages. The effectiveness of thd statute in
See note 31, supra.
41 Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 89 F.Supp. 740 (E. D.
Pa. 1950).
4 Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 19 L.W. 2276, F.2d
(3rd Cir. 1950).is Warren and Brandeis, "The Right of Privacy", 4 Harv. L. R. 193
(1890).
" N.Y. Civil Rights Law: 8 McKinney Laws, Sec. 50,51; Va.Codo
Ann., Sec. 5782; Utah Rev.Stat. 103-4-7 to 103-4-9.
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New York has been somewhat decreased by the fact that it
has been strictly construed as penal when Sec. 50 is invok-
ed,45 and as in derogation of the common law when Sec. 51
is invoked.46 At least one plaintiff has recovered under its
provisions, however, on a complaint arising out of a telecast.
The act of a professional entertainer, performing between
halves at a professional football game in Washington, D. C.
was relayed to New York by coaxial cable and there tele-
vised. Since'the re-broadcast occurred and was received in
New York, he was allowed recovery under Sec. 51 of the
New York statute.4
As compared with the New York law, the Utah and Vir-
ginia statutes have been more liberally worded and con-
strued. Virginia extends protection to the names and pic-
tures of deceased persons, but like New York, limits the
scope of the right to "advertising purposes, or for the pur-
poses of trade."48 The Utah provisions are almost identical,
except that the right is extended in favor of deceased persons
and public institutions.49
In most other states the right of privacy exists without
the aid of statutes. Only four states other than New York
have specifically determined that no such right exists at
common law: Wisconsin, Washington, Rhode Island and
People on Complaint of Stern v. Robert R. McBride & Co:, 159
Misc. 5, 228 N.Y.S. 501 (1936).
" Wilson v. Brown, 189 Misc. 79, 73 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1947). Passage of
the statute had been prompted by Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 63 N.E. 442 (1902), denying the existence of the right
of privacy at common law.
,.Gautier v. Pro-Football, .Inc., 6 R.R. 2024 (New York City Court,
June 27, 1950); commented on in 11 Fed.Com. Bar J. 95 (1950). Where-
as this.action was brought-on the basis of invasion of the'right of
privacy, it might well be contended that a property right had also been
violated. Although his performance was doubtlessly received in other
states, this plaintiff was content to sue only in New York. Multi-state
invasion of the right of privacy and, indeed, multi-state defamation as
well have given rise to perplexing and largely unsolved problems in
conflict of laws. See Note; 60 Harv. L.R. 941 (1947), characterizing the
state of the law on both points "a vacuum".
" Note 44, supra.
" Ibid.
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possibly Michigan. 50 Whereas all statutes on the right of
privacy limit their protection to instances of use for trade
purposes or in advertising, no such restrictions have been
applied as a matter of common law. All states, however,
recognize two principal limitations on the right of privacy:
consent and the public interest. No right of privacy exists
in favor of a public figure, at least as to matters of legiti-
mate public interest.5 1 And even where the right does
exist, it may be waived by consent. Consent may be ex-
pressed or implied from conduct,5 2 but in New York 'and
Utah, by statute,5 3 only written consent suffices. The New
York court seems to have quietly closed one eye to the re-
quirement of a writing.5 4
FCC Controls On Program Content
On the face of the Communications Act, the FCC has no
power over program content other than that provided in
the sections concerning lotteries and profanity, now re-
moved to the Federal criminal code, the prohibition in Sec.
325 against rebroadcasting without the consent of the origi-
nal broadcaster, and the requirement in Sec. 317 that spon-
sors be identified. Its power has arisen from the practical
consideration that the phenomenon of interference does
exist and that only a limited number of stations can effect-
ively transmit on the available wave lengths. By Sec.
307 (a) of the Communications Act, the Commission must
choose between applicants on the basis of "public interest,
convenience, and necessity." In determining which of sev-
eral applicants will best serve the "public interest, conven-
ience, and necessity", the Commission may look first at
financial and technical qualifications but ultimately must
consider the respective proposals for program service. Once
0 Judevine v. Benzies-Montayne Fuel and Whse. Co., 222 Wis. 512
269 N.W. 295 (1936); Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 P.
594 (1911); Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 14, 73 A. 97 (1909); Atkin-
son v. John E. Doherty Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899).
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co., 113 F.2d 806 (1940).
Marek v. Zanol Products Co., 298 Mass. 1, 9 N.E.2d 393 (1937);
Peterson v. KMTR Radio Corp., Los Angeles Sup. Ct., No. 557,555 (1949).
3 Note 44, supra.
See Swenke v. Pathe News, 16 F.Supp. 746, 748 (1936).
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a broadcaster has won his construction permit and license
to operate and has begun operations, his concern with FCC
program standards intensifies. He has no vested right in
"his" frequency.55 He must arrange his broadcast schedule
in such a fashion that when, three years later, he applies
for a renewal of his license, he can show, as against others
greedy for the frequency or disgusted with his policies, that
he has truly broadcast in the public interest, convenience
and necessity. The issue may arise in other proceedings:
as when a nearby station requests an increase in power or
in broadcast hours, or when a citizen who has been denied
time on the station petitions for a revocation of the station
license. Thus the industry is forced constantly to strive to
remain within the nebulous boundary of "public interest,
convenience, and necessity."
In a land accustomed to volumes of rules, regulations and
interpretations, the FCC has done surprisingly little to
define its program standards. Its announced policy is to
refuse to consider whether a proposed program will be
deemed proper.0 It has preferred to wait until the hearing
on an application or petition to determine whether the
over-all programming of an applicant is in the public in-
terest. Officially, Commission decisions furnish the only
guides. As a matter of practicality, the industry learned
early to listen intently to the out-of-school remarks of the
commissioners themselves 57 and to read carefully FCC pub-
lications. 58 Until comparatively recent times, the Commis-
sion announced, officially and unofficially, only negative
standards. The recent trend is toward affirmative require-
ments in programming.
Negative standards have arisen following the labelling
of the following types of programs "contrary to the public
interest":
Often he seems to have much, much less. See opinion of Frank-
furter, J., in National Broaqcasting Company v. United States, 319 U.S.
190 (1942); Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. Federal Communications Com-
mission, 326 U.S. 327 (1945). 48 Stat. 1083, 47 USCA, Sec. 304 expressly
requires waiver of any right that a licensee might assert to a frequency.
In re Goodman, 4 R.R. 98 (1948).
See e.g., the remarks of Chairman Coy, note 3, supra.
'Like the "Blue Book", Public Service Responsiblity of Broadcast
Licensees, report by the FCC of March 7, 1946.
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(1) Astrological and fortune telling programs. In re Scrog-
gin and Co. Bank, 1 F.C.C. 194 (1935).
(2) False or misleading advertising, especially in regard to
medicines or curative treatments. In re McGlashan, 2 F.
C.C. 145 (1935); Farmers and Bankers Life Ins. Co., 2
F.C.C. 455 (1936).
(3) Programs attacking and vilifying individuals. Trinity
Methodist Church South v. F.R.C., 62 F.2d 850 (1932),
certiorari denied, 288 U. S. 599 (1933).
(4) Defamatory statements. In re KVOS, Inc., 6 F.C.C. 22
(1938).-
(5) Suggestive programs bordering on obscenity. In re
Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., Inc., 2 F.C.C. 76 (1935).
(6) Commercialized religion. In re United States Broad-
casting Corp., 2 F.C.C. 208 (1935).
(7) Program used for editorializing station policy. In re
Mayflower Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).
(8) Broadcasting lottery information. In re Metropolitan
Broadcasting Co., 5 F.C.C. 501 (1938).
(9) Continuous broadcast of network programs. In re
Allen T. Simmons, 11 F.C.C. 1160 (1947), aff'd 169 F.2d
670, certiorari denied 335 U. S. 846 (1948).
Despite the oft-satisfied desire of quiz program partici-
pants to shout, "Hello Mom!", the transmission of messages
directed to individuals, or "point-to-point communications",
is ruled out by two considerations. First, the Commission
has long held that such messages are inconsistent with the
"terms of the station license and the regulations under which
the licenses are issued" in that they cannot reasonably be
said to have any general interest for the public. 9 Moreover,
such communications are inconsistent with the allocation of
frequencies scheme - of the International Radiotelegraph
Convention of 1927.60 Special frequencies outside the
standard bands are set aside for such service and it is pro-
vided in Art. 5, Sec. 12 of the General Regulations annexed
to the Convention that "a station shall not be permitted to
use a frequency other than that allocated, as stated above,
' In re Scroggin and Co. Bank, 1 F.C.C. 194 (1935).
1 45 Stat. 2837.
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for a service beween fixed points." Although the title of
the convention would seem to indicate that it applies only
to radio, it applies with equal force to television, since by
its terms, radio communication is deemed to include trans-
mission of "writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of
all kinds by means of Hertzian waves." 61
Recent FCC decisions and publications have outlined
affirmative program policies. For example, the Commis-
sion has ruled that the public interest demands that stations
allow time for the discussion of controversial issues. Prior
to 1945, the NAB code8 2 provided that no time should be
sold for the presentation of public controversial issues, with
the exception of political broadcasts and the public forum
type of programs. The industry stand was effectively re-
versed by In re.United Broadcasting Co.,O which held that
"the operation of any station under the extreme principles
that no time shall be sold for the discussion of controversial
public issues . . . is inconsistent with the concept of public
interest . . ." Immediately the industry was faced with
the problem of accurately defining a "public controversy."
The first administrative guide-post evolved from the peti-
tion of Rev. Sam Morris, acting on behalf of the National
Temperance and Prohibition Council and requesting the
Commission to deny the application for renewal of KRLD
on the ground that the station had carried liquor advertise-
ments, but had not allowed time for broadcasts counseling
abstinence.64 The petition was denied on the ground that
the problem was not confined to KRLD and that one station
should not be singled out for punishment, absent an "urgent
ground for selecting it rather than another." The opinion
took pains to point out, however, that the station had erred
in its refusal to sell time to petitioner. It termed the con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages a public controversial ques-
tion, and added that the issue might be raised by advertise-
ment as well as in any other manner.
nx 45 Stat. 2837, Art. 1.
62 "Standards of Commercial Practice", National Association of
Broadcasters (1944), pp. 3-4.
10 F.C.C. 515 (1945).
In re Morris, 11 F.C.C. 197 (1946).
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A few months later, the Commission considered the peti-
tion of Robert Harold Scott for the revocation of the licenses
of KQW, KPO and KFRC.6 Petitioner alleged that he was
an atheist; that the named stations had frequently carried
religious programs, but had denied him the use of their
facilities for proposed atheistic broadcasts expounding his
side of what he termed a public controversial issue. The
petition was dismissed on the same ground as the Morris
petition, supra. Again, however, the opinion sought to
establish guides for the industry. Whether it succeeded is
arguable. The Interim Report of the Select Committee to
Investigate the Federal Communications Commission de-
scribed the Scott opinion as "unintelligible and impossible of
clear and unambiguous interpretation".6 6 Though not en-
tirely lucid, the opinion does point the way in some respects.
After declaring that every idea does not rise to the dignity of
a public controversy merely because a number of persons
hold it, the opinion suggests that adherents to a belief should
be able to answer attacks even though they are few in num-
ber. The opinion recognizes that much lies in the discretion
of the broadcaster, but asserts that he should consider "the
extent of the interest of the people in his service area in a
particular subject to be discussed, as well as the qualifica-
tions of the person selected to discuss it. '167
The FCC position in requiring the airing of controversial
issues has been seriously questioned, particularly in the
aforementioned Interim Report,6 on the ground that the
only public controversies which must be broadcast are
political broadcasts covered by Sec. 315 of the Communica-
tions Act. The report charges that Commission action out-
side Sec. 315 is "quasi-judicial legislation".
Ironically, Commission action on See. 315 itself was
criticized in the same report, particularly the Port Huron
decision.6 9 In essence, the section requires that if a licensee
permits a legally qualified candidate for public office to use
0 In re Scott, 11 F.C.C. 372 (1946). *
" H. Rept. No. 2461, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948, p. 2.
, 11 F.C.C. 372, 376 (1946).
, Note 66, supra, p. 3.
In re Port Huron Broadcasting Co. (WHLS), 4 R.R. 1 (1948). See
discussion in section on defamation, 8upra.
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broadcast facilities, he must afford equal opportunities to
all other candidates for the same office. A proviso declares
that the station shall have no power of censorship, and that
"no obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow
the use of its station by any such candidate."70  Thus, by
the clear wording of the statute, it would seem that a licensee
is under no obligation to extend his facilities to any candi-
date, but having allowed one to use them, he must afford
equal opportunities to his opponents. The proviso, how-
ever, has met with strange administrative interpretation.
The clause regarding censorship has been held strong enough
to override state laws on defamation.7 1 The clause negativ-
ing a duty to extend facilities to any candidates may have
been abrogated in effect by In re Rainey.72 There a candi-
date for governor in the Texas primary complained of the
policies of four stations comprising the Texas Quality Net-
work in restricting the amount of time available for political
broadcasts. The Commission found no violation of Sec. 315,
in that time had not previously been sold- to other candidates,
but suggested that earlier decisions requiring free discus-
sion of public controversies might require the broadcast of
political addresses, especially if the candidate had been the
subject of attack by a newspaper "connected" with the sta-
tion. Specifically, it was determined that the restrictions
placed by the Texas Quality Network "do not appear to bear
a reasonable relationship to the needs or public interest in
the particular campaign." Thus a licensee who leans too
heavily on a literal reading of the last clause of Sec. 315
may find that he has failed to air a public controversy or has
otherwise run counter to the public interest.
A new twist in affirmative controls was furnished by a
recent Commission letter to WLIB. The station had openly
advocated the adoption of FEPC. The letter asserted that
WLIB must not only allow time to holders of opposing views,
but that it has "an affirmative duty to seek out, aid and
encourage the broadcast of opposing views on controversial
questions. 17
8
0 48 Stat. 1088; 47 USCA, Sec. 315, set out in full in note 37, supra.
n In re Port Huron Broadcasting Co. (WHLS), 4 R.R. 1 (1948).
72 11 F.C.C. 898 (1947).73Reported In N. Y. Times, April 16, 1950, See. 2, p. 12.
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. On March 7,1946, the Commission issued the now-famous
"Blue Book", entitled "Public Service Responsibility of
Broadcast Licensees". Though not official "agency action"
and hence not subject to judicial review, 4 the Blue Book
presented to the industry concepts it well knew would be
applied in subsequent determinations of "public interest,
convenience and necessity." In it the Commission denounc-
ed advertising excesses, concluding that "one standard of
operation in the public interest is a reasonable proportion
of time devoted to sustaining programs."75 Assigned rea-
sons were (1) the carrying of sustaining programs leads to
a well-balanced program structure; (2) provides time for
programs inappropriate for sponsorship; (8) provides time
for programs serving significant minority tastes and inter-
ests, (4) provides time for non-profit organizations, and (5)
provides time for experiment and unfettered artistic self-
expression. Affirmative standards announced were the
carrying of local live programs and programs devoted to
the discussion of public issues. Like other affirmative con-
trols announced by the Commission, the Blue Book soon
drew Cong2esaional fire.
Forces Opposing Program Controls-
The proponents of relaxed controls early learned to rise
and cry, 'ree speech!" Seldom has the cry been rewarded
with judicial victories. One obstacle is the fact that a great
portion of the Commission's directives are embodied in
dicta, unofficial remarks, and publications such as the Blue
Book 77 None are "agency action" and none are subject to
judcial review.78 Furthermore, the Commission has stead-
. Hearst Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 167
F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
" "Public Service Responsibilty of Broadcast Licensees", p. 55.
" Final Report of Select Committee to Investigate the Federal Com-
munications Commission, H. Rept. 2479, 80th Cong., 2nd Sees. For a
warm condemnation of "thought control" by the FCC, see remarks of
Senator Bridges of March 30, 1950, and April 20, 1950, reported in 96
Cong.Rec. A2502, A2995.
I For a criticism of this condition and a plea that judicial review
be extended, see Miller in 9 F.R.D. 217 (1949).
1 Hearst Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 167
F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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fastly engaged in the commendable legal stratagem of
choosing its own battlefield. The Commission has never
denied the force of the First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion or of Sec. 326 of the Communications Act, denying to
the Commission any power of censorship. It controverts no
Supreme Court decisions on the point.7s The FCC position
is simply that when inconsistent applications are presented
to it and the respective applicants are equally well qualified
legally, technically, and financially, it must, as a practical
matter, turn to program service to determine which would
better serve the public interest. In theory, the position is
logical and sound. The contention of the industry is that
the matter is not so simple: that in fact the Commission
applies its program standards in cases where there are no
opposing applications for the same facilities reciting equal
legal, technical, and financial qualifications; and that in so
doing, its action is a prior restraint on programming.
To date, however, the :industry has found little ammuni-
tion capable of inflicting serious damage to the Commis-
sion's position. The courts upheld the right of the Federal
Radio Commission to refuse an application for renewal on
grounds of poor program policies as early as 1931.80 A year
later it was held, in reference to such action, that "this is
neither censorship nor previous restraint, nor is it a whit-
tling away of the rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment, or an impairment of their free exercise."81 The FCC
stand was reinforced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in National
Broadcasting Co. v United States,s2 when he recognized that
radio, by its nature, is not open to all, and that regulation
of this sort is derived from necessity.
72 As, for example, the statement of Justice Roberts In Federal Com-
munications Commission v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S
470, 475 (1940): "The Commission Is given no supervisory control of
programs, of business management or of policy. In short, the broad-
casting field is open to anyone, provided there be an available frequency
over which he can broadcast without interference to others, If he shows
his competency, the adequacy of his equipment, and the financial ability
to make good use of the assigned channel."
91 KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n., Inc. v. Federal Radio Commission, 47
F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
n Trinity Methodist Church South v. Federal Radio Commission, 62
P.2d 850 (D. C. Cir. 1932) cert. den. 288 U.S. 559 (1933).
319 U.S. 190 (1942).
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As the courts refuse to contract FCC control over pro-
gram content, Congress has managed to rumble, but do
little more.m Just what limitations do exist as to Commis-
sion action in the field remain to be seen.
The television industry may find comfort in a recent de-
cision which holds that censorship of program content is
not a matter for state action.84 The Pennsylvania State
Board of Censors issued a regulation requiring that all films
to be televised within the state be submitted to the board for
approval. In an action by Dumont and four other corpora-
tions for a declaratory judgment, the court held the action
of the board invalid on the ground that Congress had occu-
pied the field by passing the Communications Act of 1934
and that such censorship constituted an undue and unreason-
able burden on interstate commerce.
Conclusions
Despite clamor to the contrary, the television industry is
beset by a complex pattern of limitations on programming.
Federal statutes prohibit the broadcast of lottery informa-
tion, profane or indecent language, and false advertising
concerning certain products. State statutes and case law
on defamation impose civil and criminal liability in varying
degrees. The right of privacy restricts the number of sub-
jects toward which a television camera can be safely pointed.
Commission controls, both announced and hinted, point to
fairly obvious negative standards and to the less obvious
affirmative requirements concerning public controversial
" See Interim and Final Reports of Select Committee to Investigate
the Federal Communications Commission, H. Rept. 2461, 2479, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess., 1948; remarks of Senator Bridges, 96 Oong.Reo. A2502,
A2995 (1950). The Senate refused. to strengthen, at least, the FCC
position when S.Res. 246, announcing that it is the sense of the Senate
that nothing in the Communications Act should limit the FCC when
cofisidering "public interest" on renewal applications, died in commit-
tee. 94 Cong.Rec. 6749 (1948).
', Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 86 F.Supp. 813 M.D. Pa.
1949), Aff'd. 184 F.2d 153 (3rd Cir. 1950). For an accurate prediction
of the result while the case was pending, see Bergson in 10 Fed. Bar J.
151 (1949).
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issues, political broadcasts, sustaining programs and local
live programs.
The controls themselves are somewhat limited by consti-
tutional guarantees of free speech, statutory denial of the
right of censorship by the FCC, and judicial denial of the
right of censorship by the states. With deference to Chair-
man Coy's assertion that television neglects "house-
breaking", 85 it is submitted that the industry is more than
housebroken when it operates within the numerous limita-
tions imposed upon it by law.
J. CARLTON FLEMING.
25 Note 3, supra.
